The paper adds a moral hazard problem between banks and depositors as in Gertler and Karadi (2011) to a DSGE model with a costly state verification problem between entrepreneurs and banks as in Bernanke, Gertler and Girlchrist (1999, BGG). This modification amplifies the response of the external...

I add a moral hazard problem between banks and depositors as in Gertler and Karadi (2009) to a DSGE model with a costly state verification problem between entrepreneurs and banks as in Bernanke et al. (1999) (BGG). This modification amplifies the response of the external finance premium and the...

What are the effects of changing bank lending conditions in a model in which borrowers have endogenously-persistent credit relationships with lenders? This paper answers this question in a simple Two-Agent New Keynesian (TANK) setup. Fluctuations in collateral requirements, termed collateral...

In deciding whether to roll over a loan, a relationship bank that has imperfect private information about its borrowers faces a trade-off. It wants to avoid rolling over a loan to a bad firm so as to safeguard its reputation as an effective monitor. However, refusing to roll over a loan to a...

This paper studies the effect of increased application costs on small business loan demand. Using data on loan applications, I find that applicants disproportionately choose loan amounts just below thresholds where credit underwriting requires supplementary information from applicants and...

In a relatively recent paper, Gehrig and Stenbacka (Eur Econ Rev 51, 77–99, 2007) show that information sharing increases banks’ profits to the detriment of creditworthy entrepreneurs in a model of a banking duopoly with switching costs and poaching. They restrict their analysis to the case...

Using all loans granted to firms recorded in the Italian credit register, we estimate correlations between risk-transfer and default probabilities to gauge the severity of informational asymmetries in the loan securitization market. First, the analysis confirms the presence of information...

Using credit register data for loans to Italian firms we test for the presence of asymmetric information in the securitization market by looking at the correlation between the securitization (risk-transfer) and the default (accident) probability. We can disentangle the adverse selection from the...

The credit gap in this study is given by the financing needs of firms that are bankable but discouraged from applying for a loan. To quantify the credit gap, we combine a scoring model that assesses the creditworthiness of discouraged firms with a credit allocation rule. Our study covers 35...