We determine optimal token issuance and fee rates for issuers with varying degrees of commitment. For the polar cases of no commitment (Markov perfect) and full commitment (Ramsey) we study the conditions under which equilibriums exist. Assuming convex maintenance costs guarantees well-defined...

We present a dynamic general equilibrium model of bank runs where global games are utilized as the equilibrium selection criterion. Coordination failures among bank creditors lead to panic-based runs. An endogenous borrowing constraint emerges as banks internalize the impact of their leverage...

This paper proposes a macro-banking model with corporate debt choice and investigates the impacts of bank capital regulation. Compared to non-banks, banks provide restructurable debt that resolves firm liquidations. Capital regulation corrects deposit insurance distortions but reduces bank debt...

I investigate the impact of bank capital requirements in a business cycle model with corporate debt choice. Compared to non-bank investors, banks provide restructurable loans that reduce firm bankruptcy losses and enhance production efficiency. Raising capital requirements eliminates deposit...

Financial covenants influence firm behavior by state-contingently allocating decision rights. I develop a quantitative model with long-term debt where shareholders cannot commit to not dilute existing lenders with new debt issuances and risky investments. Lenders intervene upon covenant...

We show that the correlation across financial institutions is a major force that increases their overall fragility. Our model features a financial system with financial institutions individually prone to runs and interconnected through fire sales. Strategic complementarities within and across...