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Bounded Rationality and the Choice of Jury Selection Procedures

Van der Linden, Martin - 2017

A peremptory challenge procedure allows the parties to a jury trial to dismiss some prospective jurors without justification. Complex challenge procedures offer an unfair advantage to parties who are better able to strategize. I introduce a new measure of strategic complexity based on...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014122733

Bounded rationality and the choice of jury selection procedures

Linden, Martin van der - In: The journal of law & economics 61 (2018) 4, pp. 711-738

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012026585

Selecting less corruptible bureaucrats

Hu, Audrey Xianhua; Zou, Liang - 2007

A government officials' propensity to corruption, or corruptibility, can be affected by his intertemporal preference over job benefits. Through a dynamic model of rent-seeking behavior, this paper examines how endogenously determined corruptibility changes with monitoring intensity, salary...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011373824

The socio-economic order and forensic economics

Tinari, Frank D. - In: International journal of social economics 20 (1993) 8, pp. 4-11

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001150102

Firms' ownership, employees' altruism, and product market competition

De Chiara, Alessandro; Manna, Ester - In: Economic modelling 109 (2022), pp. 1-16

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013348227

Sabotages in Promotion Tournaments

Chen, Kong-Pin - 2003

The paper studies the nature, determinants, and impacts of "negative" activities in organizations. In competing for promotion, the members in organizations can work not only to enhance their own performances, but also to "sabotage" their opponents' performances. They find it worthwhile to engage...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014093587

Sabotage in Promotion Tournaments

Chen, Kong-pin - 2010

The paper studies the nature, determinants, and impact of negative activities in organizations. In competing for promotion, the members in organizations can work not only to enhance their own performances, but also to 'sabotage' their opponent's performances. It is worthwhile for them to engage...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014101345

Sabotages in Promotion Tournaments

Chen, Kong-Pin - 2003

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014105907

Job matching, competition and managerial incentives

Dam, Kaniska - 2009

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003905210

Signaling with performance and the effect of competition

Suzuki, Toru - 2010

violated. It is shown that more competition makes the equilibrium signaling more informative when the level of competition is … moderate. Moreover, the equilibrium signaling can perfectly reveal the ability under a certain level of competition. On the … other hand, too much competition always makes the equilibrium signaling less informative. -- Signalling ; Competition …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008747614