We provide a systematic analysis of fiscal consolidation in a medium-scale dynamic general equilibrium model. Our results show that the choice of the consolidation instrument is very important, not only with respect to the short- and long-run output effects of the different consolidation...

We provide a systematic analysis of fiscal consolidation in a dynamic general equilibrium model with a detailed government sector and a share of credit-constrained households. We simulate permanent cuts in government consumption, government investment, and transfer payments as well as permanent...

How should public debt be managed when uncertainty about the business cycle is widespread and debt levels are high, as in the aftermath of the last financial crisis? This paper analyzes optimal fiscal policy with ambiguity aversion and endogenous government spending. We show that, without...

We present new evidence showing that fiscal austerity strengthens support for redistribution, especially for the relatively well-off. Our theoretical model proposes two mechanisms to explain this heterogeneity in support for redistribution: "altruism" and "appreciation". We test our theoretical...

Fiscal policy and public debt may be required to maintain full employment and avoid secular stagnation. This conclusion emerges from a range of different models, including OLG specifications and stock-flow consistent (post-) Keynesian models. One of the determinants of the required long-run debt...

This paper examines the implications of different monetary and fiscal policy rules in an economy characterized by Harrodian instability. We show that (i) a monetary rule along Taylor lines can be stabilizing for low debt ratios but becomes de-stabilizing if the debt ratio exceeds a certain...

This paper makes three main points. Fiscal policy, first, may be needed in the long run to maintain full employment and avoid secular stagnation. If fiscal policy is used in this way, second, the long-run debt ratio depends (i) inversely on the rate of growth, (ii) inversely on government...