We develop a dynamic agency model of a public corporation. Managers underinvest because of risk aversion. They smooth rents and payout. They do not exploit interest tax shields fully. The interactions of investment, debt and payout decisions can change drastically depending on managers'...

We explore whether theoretically the target leverage and pecking order models can be reconciled with payout smoothing. Investment absorbs a significant part of income and asset volatility if the firm follows both a payout target and a net debt ratio (NDR) target. A positive (negative) NDR...

We develop a dynamic agency model where payout, investment and financing decisions are made by managers who attempt to maximize the rents they take from the firm, subject to a capital market constraint. Managers smooth payout in order to smooth their flow of rents. Total payout (dividends plus...

"We develop a model where dividend payout, investment and financing decisions are made by managers who attempt to maximize the rents they take from the firm. But the threat of intervention by outside shareholders constrains rents and forces rents and dividends to move in lockstep. Managers are...