It is well known that the literature on judgment aggregation inherits the impossibility results from the aggregation of preferences that it generalises. This is due to the fact that the typical judgment aggregation problem induces an ultrafilter on the the set of individuals, as was shown in a...

Eliaz (2004) has established a "meta-theorem" for preference aggregation which implies both Arrow's Theorem (1963) and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem (1973, 1975). This theorem shows that the driving force behind impossibility theorems in preference aggregation is the mutual exclusiveness of...

The problem of how to rationally aggregate probability measures occurs in particular (i) when a group of agents, each holding probabilistic beliefs, needs to rationalise a collective decision on the basis of a single 'aggregate belief system' and (ii) when an individual whose belief system is...

Amartya Sen (1970) has shown that three natural desiderata for social choice rules are inconsistent: universal domain, respect for unanimity, and respect for some minimal rights - which can be interpreted as either expert rights or liberal rights. Dietrich and List (2008) have generalised this...

This paper studies collective decision making with regard to convex risk measures: It addresses the question whether there exist nondictatorial aggregation functions of convex risk measures satisfying Arrow-type rationality axioms (weak universality, systematicity, Pareto principle). Herein,...

This paper continues Dietrich and List's [2010] work on propositional-attitude aggregation theory, which is a generalised unification of the judgment-aggregation and probabilistic opinion-pooling literatures. We first propose an algebraic framework for an analysis of (many-valued)...