We analyze a dynamic principal-agent problem in which the agent's effort in each period has strong persistent effects. We show that a simple contract, where the reward depends only on the final outcome, is explained as the optimal contract derived in the principal's optimization problem. The...

We provide a school choice model where the student priority orders are allowed not to be total. We introduce a class of algorithms each of which derive a student optimal stable matching once we have an initial stable matching. Since there is a method to derive a stable matching, we can derive a...

We construct a new method to describe firm distributions within technology fields and investigate the relationship between those distributions and aggregate innovation. To locate firms in a technology space, we apply multidimensional scaling for inter-firm technological dissimilarity, computed...

We consider a school choice matching model where priorities for schools are represented by binary relations that may not be total orders. Even in that case, it is necessary to construct total orders from the priority relations to execute several mechanisms. We focus on the extensions of the...