In a Case Law regime Courts have more flexibility than in a Statute Law regime. Since Statutes are inevitably incomplete, this confers an advantage to the Statute Law regime over the Case Law one. However, all Courts rule ex-post, after most economic decisions are already taken. Therefore, the...

We find an economic rationale for the common sense answer to the question in our title - courts should not always enforce what the contracting parties write. We describe and analyze a contractual environment that allows a role for an active court. An active court can improve on the outcome that...

In a Case Law regime Courts have more flexibility than in a Statute Law regime. Since Statutes are inevitably incomplete, this confers an advantage to the Statute Law regime over the Case Law one. However, all Courts rule ex-post, after most economic decisions are already taken. Therefore, the...

We study a contracting model with unforeseen contingencies in which the court is an active player. Ex-ante, the contracting parties cannot include the risky unforeseen contingencies in the contract they draw up. Ex-post the court observes whether an unforeseen contingency occurred, and decides...

This Article develops an analytic framework for understanding the role of uncertainty in regulatory design. It begins by differentiating between three types of uncertainty: legal uncertainty, factual uncertainty, and uncertainty about the application of law to fact. This framework highlights the...

How should intermediaries influence the insurance demand decision? The answer must refer to the interdependence of economic determinants and legal duties. Intermediaries potentially guide demand decisions by delivering objective information and by considering individuals' situation and economic...

How do mechanisms that enforce cooperation emerge in a society where none are available and agents are endowed with just raw power that allows a more powerful agent to expropriate a less powerful one? We study a model where expropriation is costly and agents can choose whether to engage in...

In three experiments, we examine how an employer reputation system disciplines an online labor market (Amazon Mechanical Turk) in which employers may decline to pay workers while keeping their work product. These three experiments test the value of the employer reputation system for workers,...

This paper applies a Hotelling model of two-sided markets in analyzing an emergent approach to marketing textbooks. In this approach, a platform provides the content of electronic textbooks for free. This free content spurs sales of complementary products such as a print version of the textbook....

Road cycling races, although won by individual riders, are a competition of teams. Riding behind other riders significantly reduces the energy required to hold a given speed. These races thus provide free-riding incentives. We introduce a game-theoretic framework of this strategic setup to...