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On the failure of core convergence in economies with asymmetric information

Serrano, Roberto; Vohra, Rajiv; Volij, Oscar - In: Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an … 69 (2001) 6, pp. 1685-1696

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001624985

Type diversity and virtual Bayesian implementation

Serrano, Roberto (contributor); Vohra, Rajiv (contributor) - 2000 - [Elektronische Ressource]

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001517622

Non-cooperative implementation of the core

Serrano, Roberto - In: Social choice and welfare 14 (1997) 4, pp. 513-525

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001228784

Implementing the Mas-Colell bargaining set

Serrano, Roberto (contributor); Vohra, Rajiv (contributor) - 2001 - [Elektronische Ressource]

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001584093

Some limitations of virtual Bayesian implementation

Serrano, Roberto; Vohra, Rajiv - In: Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an … 69 (2001) 3, pp. 771-784

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001585558

Bargaining and bargaining sets

Serrano, Roberto; Vohra, Rajiv - In: Games and economic behavior 39 (2002) 2, pp. 292-308

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001671954

A characterization of virtual Bayesian implementation

Serrano, Roberto (contributor); Vohra, Rajiv (contributor) - 2002 - [Elektronische Ressource]

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001675328

A characterization of virtuel Bayesian implementation

Serrano, Roberto; Vohra, Rajiv - In: Games and economic behavior 50 (2005) 2, pp. 312-331

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002612920

Implementing the Mas-Colell bargaining set

Serrano, Roberto; Vohra, Rajiv - In: Investigaciones económicas 26 (2002) 2, pp. 285-298

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002388818

A Characterization of Virtual Bayesian Implementation

Serrano, Roberto; Vohra, Rajiv - 2002

We provide a characterization of virtual Bayesian implementation in environments satisfying no-total-indifference. A social choice function in such environments is virtually Bayesian implementable if and only if it satisfies incentive compatibility and a condition we term virtual monotonicity....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014117036