The stagnation of the Italian economy over the last two decades is widely documented. During this period, the world economy has become highly integrated, and foreign outsourcing has become a standard practice for firms. While trade theory predicts benefits from the internationalization of...

In this note we consider the preferences of a profit maximizing firm for international ownership in a world in which firms compete in an international Cournot oligopoly, and in which countries use strategic trade policy. We find that firms prefer national ownership and show that full...

This paper studies the effect of production subsidies used as strategic instruments by two rivalling countries whose firms differ in production efficiency. In particular, it examines the welfare effects of a uniform subsidy reduction from the Cournot-Nash equilibrium under different assumptions...

Entry in a homogeneous Cournot oligopoly can be excessive if there is business stealing. Since this excessive entry prediction has been established, a variety of circumstances have been identified which allow for insufficient entry, despite the business stealing externality. This paper shows...

We develop a 2×2×2 model with the following features: (1) one sector is perfectly competitive while the other is oligopolistic; (2) one country has unemployment while the other attains full employment; (3) oligopolists move internationally; and (4) the ownership of each oligopolist is...

This paper studies the effect of an online retailer on spatial tax competition with mobile consumers. If taxation for online purchases follows the destination principle, the entry of the online retailer mitigates tax competition; if taxation for online purchases follows the origin principle, the...

This paper studies the effect of an online retailer on spatial tax competition with mobile consumers. Under non-cooperative Leviathan governments, tax treatment of online purchases according to the destination principle mitigates tax competition; tax treatment of online purchases of online...

We study the profitability incentives of merger and the endogenous industry structure in a strategic trade policy environment. Merger changes the strategic trade policy equlilibrium. We show that merger can be profitable and welfare enhancing here, even though it would not be profitable in a...

In this note we consider the preferences of a profit maximizing firm for international ownership in a world in which firms compete in an international Cournot oligopoly, and in which countries use strategic trade policy. We find that firms prefer national ownership and show that full...

This paper studies how cross-sector strategic trade policy affects wages, country-wide profits, and welfare. I develop a simple model of two-country continuum-of-sectors general oligopolistic equilibrium. Demands are linear and sectors involve one domestic firm competing on quantity with its...