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In contrast to previous empirical work on electoral cycles, which implicitly assumes the executive has full discretion over fiscal policy, this paper contends that under separation of powers an unaligned legislature may have a moderating role. Focusing on the budget surplus, we find that...
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We first study theoretically how intergovernmental relations affect political budget cycles (PBCs) within federal countries, introducing a national incumbent that favors aligned districts in a model where discretionary fiscal policy is subject to credibility problems. Then we analyze Argentina's...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012952633
While existing cross-country studies on political budget cycles rely on annual data, we build a panel with quarterly and monthly data from Latin American and OECD countries over the 1980-2005 period. Disaggregated data allow to center the electoral year more precisely, and show the effects are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003875265
To understand how intergovernmental relations affect political budget cycles (PBCs) within federal countries, we model the credibility problems of discretionary fiscal policy in combination with a national incumbent that favors aligned districts. Analyzing Argentina's provinces during the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011568866
Under asymmetric information, dishonest sellers lead to market unraveling in the lemons model. An additional cost of dishonesty is that language becomes cheap talk. We develop instead a model where people derive utility from actions (what they say), as well as from outcomes, so talk is costly....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013102884
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In economics, the standard approach to language is that talk is cheap. Here, instead, language is a social convention that affects utility. Unless language is used in its ordinary sense, it cannot help to coordinate actions because there is no way of decoding it. This points to a unique...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008903436
Political budget cycles (PBCs) result from the credibility problems that office-motivated incumbents face under asymmetric information, due to their temptation to manipulate fiscal policy to increase their electoral chances. We analyze the role of rules that limit debt, crucial for aggregate...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014208125
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