Regulatory independence has been proposed as a mechanism to alleviate the commitment problem associated to the sunk nature of investments in network industries. This paper summarizes the author's and others' work in this field (in a pause to take stock of several years of research) and, in...

This paper extends a basic 'common agency' model of policy determination to a case of a policy vector where lobbies have oppposed interests in one of the instruments. Liberalisation takes the form of an entrant that has to access the incumbent's network, while the incumbent remains vertically...

A new perspevtive is provided on the under-investment problem in the regulation of a firm with market power. We compare a political equilibrium based on a voting model with lobbying with a delegation equilbrium, where a government can delegate to a particular 'type' of pro- or anti-industry...

We examine the hold-up problem of price regulation and compare it with the monetary policy credibility problem. For both, reputational solutions are possible provided that the policymaker is sufficiently far-sighted, but the hold-up problem in regulation turns out to be more serious than the...

Regulatory independence has been proposed as a mechanism to alleviate the commitment problem associated to the sunk nature of investments in network industries, including telecommunications. This paper summarizes the authors’ and others’ work in this field (in a pause to take stock of...