This paper deals with the risk of opportunism – the usual risk in economic exchanges. The breach of contract is probably the most common event in daily life and has therefore attracted research and debates in many disciplines of the social sciences. Our discussion deals with the current...

This work develops an abstract, theory-founded understanding of organization-internal infor­mation security. For this purpose, established knowledge from the field of information security is restructured on the basis of two different dimensions: The historical dimension distinguishes three...

Does corporate governance structure matter for firm value? We develop a model in which the allocation of control rights between shareholders and managers (“governance structure”) affects managers' incentive to invest (strong governance tightens managerial freedom and weak governance loosens...

Traditionally, researchers have had difficulty testing the relationship between the degree of risk or uncertainty in workers' environments and incentive pay. The authors employ Prendergast's (2002) theory that incorporates the delegation of worker authority into the principal-agent model to...

Why do lawyers in some jurisdictions continue to ‘automatically’ exclude the 1980 UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) in their choices of law for international sales contracts? Why do lawyers in other jurisdictions approach the decision very differently? Why...

Two system-based views exist regarding managerial value chain analysis: Theory of Constraints (TOC) and Activity-Based Costing (ABC). There has been considerable debate whether TOC or ABC is the more optimal approach for strategic planning. This study seeks to compare TOC and ABC, while keeping...

By analyzing production with a continuum of tasks subject to common stochastic effects, the analysis shows that tension between business commonality and standardization is an important source of product cycles. The paper addresses the question of whether business commonality and standardization...

I analyse firms organisational choices when they face uncertainty about institutional conditions in foreign locations with heterogeneous final good producers and incomplete contracts. As firms learn about the conditions abroad, the increasing offshoring activity increases competition in the...

The authors empirically test Prendergast’s (2002) theory that incorporates the delegation of worker authority into the principal-agent model to explain the lack of consistent empirical support for a tradeoff between risk and incentives. Using data from the 1998 British WERS, the authors...