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Martin, Antoine; Monnet, Cyril - 2002

We propose a theory to explain the choice between nominal and indexed labor contracts. We find that contracts should be indexed if prices are difficult to forecast and nominal otherwise. Our analysis is based on a principal-agent model developed by Jovanovic and Ueda (1997) in which...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014122274

Sabotages in Promotion Tournaments

Chen, Kong-Pin - 2003

The paper studies the nature, determinants, and impacts of "negative" activities in organizations. In competing for promotion, the members in organizations can work not only to enhance their own performances, but also to "sabotage" their opponents' performances. They find it worthwhile to engage...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014105907

Equilibrium Contingent Fees with Heterogeneous Attorneys

Santore, Rudy - 2005

This paper provides a signaling model to analyze the equilibrium fee structures arising when attorneys are heterogeneous with regard to unobservable ability. Unlike fixed fees, contingent fees are more profitable to attorneys who have a greater probability of winning, and thus may serve as an...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014063158

Favoritism Under Social Pressure

Garicano, Luis; Palacios-Huerta, Ignacio; Prendergast, … - 2001

This paper provides empirical evidence of favoritism by agents, where that favoritism is generated by social pressure. To do so, we explore the behavior of professional soccer referees. Referees have discretion over the addition of extra time at the end of a soccer game (called injury time), to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014128582

Sabotages in Promotion Tournaments

Chen, Kong-Pin - 2003

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014093587

Optimal Incentive Contracts When Workers Envy Their Boss

Dur, Robert A. J.; Glazer, Amihai - 2004

A worker's utility may increase in his own income, but envy can make his utility decline with his employer's income … various assumptions about the object and generality of envy. Envy amplifies the effect of incentives on effort and, therefore …, increases optimal incentive pay. Moreover, envy can make profit-sharing optimal, even when the worker's effort is fully …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014029345

Optimal incentive contracts when workers envy their boss

Dur, Robert A. J.; Glazer, Amihai - 2006

A worker's utility may increase with his income, but envy can make his utility decline with his employer's income. This … article uses a principal-agent model to study profit-maximizing contracts when a worker envies his employer. Envy tightens the … applications of our theoretical work: envy can explain why a lower-level worker is awarded stock options, why incentive pay is …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011335185

Wage formation and the impact of envy

Uddén Sonnegård, Eva - 1991

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000827782

The causes and economic consequences of envy

Cabrales, Antonio - In: SERIEs : Journal of the Spanish Economic Association 1 (2010) 4, pp. 371-386

flexibility. I suggest that labor and human resource economics can benefit from including envy into the standard set of factors … considered in their theoretical and empirical models. -- envy ; interdependent preferences ; skill segregation ; wage dynamics …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009355901

Temporary Help Work : Compensating Differentials and Multiple Job-Holding

Hamersma, Sarah - 2012

Temporary Help Services (THS) employment has been growing in size, particularly among disadvantaged workers, and in importance in balancing cyclical fluctuations in labor demand. Does THS employment provide some benefits to disadvantaged workers, or divert them from better jobs? We investigate...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013099805