We study the role of transfers in the timing of matching. In our model, some agents have the option of matching early and exiting in period 1, before others arrive in period 2; in period 2 there is a centralized institution that implements a stable matching after all agents arrive. We prove that...

This paper develops strategic foundations for an important statistical model of random networks with heterogeneous expected degrees. Based on this, we show how social networking services that subtly alter the costs and indirect benefits of relationships can cause large changes in behavior and...

In the recent decades, citizens all over the world took to the streets to oppose predatory autocracies. We provide a theory of mass politics examining how civil protests affect authoritarian stability. We ask when mass protests are likely to spread and under what conditions they are likely to...

This paper studies the impact of increasing trading frequency in financial markets on allocative efficiency. We build and solve a dynamic model of sequential double auctions in which traders trade strategically with demand schedules. Trading needs are generated by time-varying private...

We propose a novel proportional cost-sharing mechanism for funding public goods with interdependent values: the agents simultaneously submit bids, which are non-negative numbers; the expenditure on the public good is an increasing and concave function of the sum of the bids; and each agent is...

I construct an informationally robust auction to sell a common-value good. I examine the revenue guarantee of an auction over all information structures of bidders and all equilibria. As the number of bidders gets large, the revenue guarantee of my auction converges to the full surplus,...