This paper develops a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model to study how the instability of the banking sector can amplify and propagate business cycles. The model builds on Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (BGG) (1999), who consider credit demand friction due to agency cost, but it...

We introduce financial frictions in the spirit of Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) into a standard RBC model and use the heterogeneous-prior framework of Angeletos, Collard, and Dellas (2018) to accommodate confidence-driven business cycle fluctuations. We show that financial frictions...

I add a moral hazard problem between banks and depositors as in Gertler and Karadi (2009) to a DSGE model with a costly state verification problem between entrepreneurs and banks as in Bernanke et al. (1999) (BGG). This modification amplifies the response of the external finance premium and the...

The paper adds a moral hazard problem between banks and depositors as in Gertler and Karadi (2011) to a DSGE model with a costly state verification problem between entrepreneurs and banks as in Bernanke, Gertler and Girlchrist (1999, BGG). This modification amplifies the response of the external...

This paper studies the efficiency of financial intermediation through securitization in a model with heterogeneous investment projects and asymmetric information about the quality of securitized assets. I show that when retaining part of the risk, the issuer of securitized assets may credibly...

By combining the approaches of Gertler and Karadi (2011) and Bernanke et al. (1999), I develop a DSGE model with leverage constraints both in the banking and in the non-financial firm sector. I calibrate this "full model" to US data. In a world with only a monetary policy and a productivity...