Herein we explore whether a solemn oath can eliminate hypothetical bias in a voting referenda. First, we reject the null hypothesis that a hypothetical bias does not exist. Second, we cannot reject the hypothesis that after signing an oath people are as likely to vote for a public good in a...

We consider corruption behavior in a three-players game: Principal, Agent, Briber. We argue that when the Principal chooses a fair wage, the Agent faces conflicting interests to reciprocate. This gives rise to a delegation effect, which could undercut corruption as compared to what arises in two...

We consider corruption behavior in a three-players game: Principal, Agent, Corrupter. When the Principal chooses a fair wage, the Agent faces conflicting interests to reciprocate. This delegation effect is expected to lower the level of corruption as compared to what arises in two-players...

We study how cooperation-enforcing institutions dynamically affect values and behavior using a lab experiment designed to create individual specific histories of past institutional exposure. We show that the effect of past institutions is mostly due to “indirect” behavioral spillovers:...

We develop and estimate a generalized labour supply model that incorporates work effort into the standard consumption-leisure trade-off. We allow workers a choice between two contracts: a piece rate contract, wherein he is paid per unit of service provided, and a mixed contract, wherein he...

We propose a search-matching model of the marriage market that extends Shimer and Smith (2000) to allow for labor supply. We characterize the steady-state equilibrium when exogenous divorce is the only source of risk. The estimated matching probabilities that can be derived from the steady-state...