The important flows of irregular migration could not exist without the emergence of a criminal market for smuggling services. A matching model à la Pissarides (2000) provides a well-suited framework to analyze such a flow market with significant trade frictions. Our analysis considers the...

This paper proposes a two-country model of migration in a transferable skill sector, where workers education is provided free of charge by governments. We study firstly the non-cooperative equilibrium where the poor country decides on the education level and the rich country decides on the quota...

This paper provides a micro-funded theory of multilateral resistance to migration analyzing how financial constraints determine migration trends. We build a RUM model in which we explicitly introduce the budget constraint in the migration decision: individuals cannot afford migrating to a...

We provide a theoretical framework to analyze how financial constraints hinder migration. Introducing wealth heterogeneity and borrowing constraints into a random utility maximization model of migration, we find evidence of multilateral resistance to migration stemming from borrowing...

This text develops a bargaining trade union model which includes working time and wages in the set of negotiated variables, the "right to manage" of the firm being limited to employment decision. The model allows for time varying effectiveness of workers and fixed costs of labor and considers a...

The dominant approach to monetary policy builds on simple linear policy rules, assumed to describe the systematic response of central banks to various shocks. The last financial crisis has shown that in difficult times central banks follow more sophisticated strategies. We argue in this paper...

In the model, a group of investors are invited to participate to a high-yield collective project. The project succeeds only if a minimum participation rate is reached. Before taking their decision, investors receive a vague statement about the outcome of a past investment decision. If investors...

We investigate the dynamics of cooperation in public good games when contributions to the public good are immediately redistributed across contributors (intra-temporal transfers) and when contributions to the public good by the current group are transferred over time to a future group...