Similar Search Results

Should central banks lean against the bubble? : the monetary policy conundrum under credit frictions and capital accumulation

Ciccarone, Giuseppe; Giuli, Francesco; Marchetti, Enrico - In: Journal of macroeconomics 59 (2019), pp. 195-216

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012245000

Undesired monetary policy effects in a bubbly economy

Ciccarone, Giuseppe; Giuli, Francesco; Marchetti, Enrico; … - 2022

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013455146

Undesired monetary policy effects in a bubbly world

Ciccarone, Giuseppe; Giuli, Francesco; Marchetti, Enrico; … - In: Macroeconomic dynamics 28 (2024) 4, pp. 913-945

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015055125

Robust policies in a sticky information economy

Giuli, Francesco - In: Macroeconomic dynamics 14 (2010) 3, pp. 311-342

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003981114

Prices and distribution in a Sraffian credit economy

Ciccarone, Giuseppe - In: Review of political economy 10 (1998) 4, pp. 399-413

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001418307

L' esogeneità del tasso di interesse e i giochi cooperativi

Ciccarone, Giuseppe - In: Rivista di politica economica 87 (1997) 2, pp. 89-110

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001222482

Finance and the Cambridge equation

Ciccarone, Giuseppe - In: Review of political economy 16 (2004) 2, pp. 163-177

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002021311

Market versus government failures under risk and under uncertainty

Ciccarone, Giuseppe - In: Journal of public finance and public choice : JPFPC 35 (2020) 1, pp. 81-106

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012656625

Finance and the Cambridge equation : again on the rate of profits of financial intermediaries

Ciccarone, Giuseppe - In: Review of political economy 20 (2008) 3, pp. 433-441

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003769508

(In)efficient Separations, Firing Costs and Temporary Contracts

Gerali, Andrea; Guglielminetti, Elisa; Liberati, Danilo - 2021

In this paper we study the allocative (in)efficiency of employment protection in relation to firing costs, in a general equilibrium model with labor market frictions. The optimal firing costs depend on the level of unemployment benefits and the degree of centralized wage bargaining, two features...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013226477