Creative teams drive the idea-economy, yet the determinants of a team's ability to create new ideas are not universally agreed upon. Group-level diversity has gained the most traction as an explanation, where a team's performance is usually attributed to diversity over observed characteristics...

Tournaments are widely used in organizations, explicitly or implicitly, to reward the best-performing employees, e.g., through promotion or bonuses, and to punish the worst-performing employees, e.g., through firing or unfavorable job assignments. We use a principal-agent model to compare the...

Many policies addressing global climate change revolve around the implementation of mitigation and adaptation strategies. We experimentally examine subjects? choices in a climate change game where subjects are put into groups where they face a potential damage and have the choice to invest...

We utilize a laboratory experiment to compare effort provision under optimal tournament contracts with different distributions of prizes which motivate agents to compete to be first, avoid being last, or both. We find that the combined tournament contract incorporating both incentives at the top...

Managers often use tournament incentive schemes which motivate workers to compete for the top, compete to avoid the bottom, or both. In this paper we test the effectiveness and efficiency of these incentive schemes. To do so, we utilize optimal contracts in a principal-agent setting, using a...

Organizational learning-by-doing has long been used to explain firm behavior and economic growth where the underlying models and analysis are built upon observations from the manufacturing sector. Though that sector is still relevant, firms are increasingly reliant upon creative processes, yet...