We estimate the economic costs of financial distress due to lost sales, by exploiting cross-supplier variation in real estate assets and leverage and the timing of real estate shocks. We show that for the same client buying from different suppliers, its purchases from distressed suppliers...

We estimate the economic costs of financial distress by exploiting cross-supplier variation in real estate assets and leverage, and the timing of real estate shocks. We show that for the same client buying from different suppliers, its purchases from distressed suppliers decline by an additional...

We show that credit rating agencies can influence political elections. We find that incumbent political parties experience an increase in their vote shares following municipal bond upgrades. The evidence is consistent with rating agencies affecting elections indirectly through an expansion of...

We find that the number of independent directors on corporate boards increases by approximately 24% following financial covenant violations in credit agreements. Most of these new directors have links to creditors. Firms that appoint new directors after violations are more likely to issue new...