We expect competitors to act as each other's foes. Yet some companies own equity stakes in their competitors. The Article explores this phenomenon of companies owning about 5-15% of the competition and conjectures a few explanations for this investment strategy. The focus of the Article is on...

The Trust Indenture Act prohibits a binding vote of bondholders to change any core term-principal amount, interest rate, or maturity date-of a bond issue. In this Article, I show how the prohibition on a collective action clause inhibits a troubled company's ability to reorganize outside of...

This paper provides a different way of thinking about, and dealing with, four important issues. First, the overarching purpose of a firm involves communicating a vision, organizing to survive and prosper, working continually to develop win-win relationships, and taking care of future...

We examine how executive pension and deferred compensation plans affect bank risk-taking. We show that banks with more inside debt incentives are 5-8% less likely to approve risky mortgages. Using state individual tax rates as instruments, we show that the effect is likely to be causal. Further...

Over the period 1980-2007 multinational firms' investment grew four times faster than worldwide GDP. Yet the evidence on whether global diversification is valuable is inconclusive. This paper uses detailed FDI data for 251 UK multinational firms and 4,676 subsidiaries to show that multinational...

This paper presents evidence that subsidiaries of multinational firms have higher valuations than locally matched firms. Using a unique sample of 251 UK multinational firms and 4,676 subsidiaries, the paper finds that multinational firms achieve, on average, an international diversification...

We consider how the state should regulate the consumption of pecuniary private benefits of control by controlling shareholders. These benefits have efficient aspects: they compensate the controlling shareholder for monitoring managers and for investing effort to create and implement projects....

This paper is a comment on Henry G. Manne (2010), “Corporate Governance – Getting Back to Market Basics.” Professor Manne authoritatively contends that regulation should not tamper with corporate governance, because in so doing regulation undermines the efficiency of stock markets and of...