We measure a manager's risk-taking incentives as the total sensitivity of the manager's debt, stock, and option holdings to firm volatility. We compare this measure to the option vega and to relative measures used by the prior literature. Vega does not capture risk-taking incentives from...

Using a shock to transparency in a parimutuel betting market, we show that capital flows increase in public information even in markets with largely risk-seeking participants. The evidence indicates that capital allocation decisions are partly a function of behavioral mechanisms such as the...

We show that, on average, product market competition acts as a disciplining force constraining managers from misreporting accounting information. Further, in a quasi-natural experiment that uses shifts in import tariffs to identify intensification of competition, difference-in-difference...

We show that, on average, product market competition acts as a disciplining force constraining managers from misreporting accounting information. Further, in a quasi-natural experiment that uses shifts in import tariffs to identify intensification of competition, difference-in-difference...