We develop a dynamic two-party political economy framework, in which parties seek to maximize vote share and face the trade-off between catering to their respective core constituencies on the one hand and "middle of the road" voters with no partisan affiliation on the other hand. In contrast to...

We develop a dynamic two-party political economy framework, in which parties seek to maximize vote share and face the trade-off between catering to their respective core constituencies on the one hand and ‘middle of the road’ voters with no partisan affiliation on the other hand. In contrast...

This paper shows how provision of public goods differ in the context of centralisation and decentralisation when the incumbent politician confers the responsibility of the actual provision to a bureaucrat who extracts bribe from the public and provides a predetermined portion of it to the...

We study identification of preferences in static single-agent discrete choice models where decision makers may be imperfectly informed about the state of the world. We leverage the notion of one-player Bayes Correlated Equilibrium by Bergemann and Morris (2016) to provide a tractable...

Why do lawyers in some jurisdictions continue to ‘automatically’ exclude the 1980 UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) in their choices of law for international sales contracts? Why do lawyers in other jurisdictions approach the decision very differently? Why...

To accurately quantify the effects of government spending, it is necessary to identify exogenous changes in government spending. In this paper, we estimate a proxy VAR, developed by Stock and Watson (2012) and Mertens and Ravn (2013), using a revised supplementary budget from the government as...

We propose a theory of endogenous polarization where a political elite strategically initiates conflicts between groups of people to polarize society and strengthen the elite's power. In the model, interactions between two groups of people result in stochastic gains, which are taxed by the...

In the classic Meltzer and Richard (1981) model, the canonical model of income redistribution in democracies, voters, heterogeneous on the sole dimension of idiosyncratic productivity, evaluate an income-redistributive program that pays everyone a lump-sum income subsidy financed by a distorting...

Unanticipated changes in tax policy are likely to have different macroeconomic effects compared to anticipated changes due to several mechanisms, including fiscal foresight and policy uncertainty. It is therefore important to understand what drives such policy surprises. We explore the nature of...

We analyse the determination of taxes on harmful goods when consumers have self-control problems. We show that under reasonable assumptions, the socially optimal corrective tax exceeds the average distortion caused by self-control problems. Further, we analyse how individuals with self-control...