We study bilateral bargaining problems with interested third parties, the stakeholders that enjoy benefits upon a … potential willingness of the stakeholder to make contributions to promote agreement may be the source of severe inefficiency …. However, and more surprisingly, for a wide range of parameter values this outcome is better for the stakeholder than if he …

We study bilateral bargaining problems with interested third parties, the stakeholders that enjoy benefits upon a … potential willingness of the stakeholder to make contributions to promote agreement may be the source of severe inefficiency …. However, and more surprisingly, for a wide range of parameter values this outcome is better for the stakeholder than if he …

effects on strike incidence. This ambiguity may explain why higher strike costs need not always lead to fewer strikes, and … incidence data. Although couched in terms of strikes, the results are equally applicable to other negotiation situations …

Strikes, just as other types of conflict, used to be difficult to explain from an economic perspective. Initially, it … asymmetric information to prominence as a significant cause of strikes. After reviewing such long-standing potential explanations … with the union can lead to strikes. Additionally, power asymmetries, reputation-building, and internal union politics can …

The labor economics literature has shown that the "efficient bargaining" model, in which wage and employment are … wage is determined via bargaining and employment determined subsequently and unilaterally by the firm. This paper reports … an experiment in which the choice of the bargaining agenda is endogenous within a noncooperative game. We find that …

The purpose of this paper is to analyze bargaining between a firm and a finite set of workers. In particular employment … selected workers then decide whether they want to proceed in bargaining with the firm. Finally, bargaining takes place. In …

in this class combine three attractive features: they are defined on the entire domain of convex n-person bargaining …