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Secure implementation in economies with indivisible objects and money

Fujinaka, Yuji (contributor); Wakayama, Takuma (contributor) - 2007

This paper studies the application of the notion of secure implementation (Cason, Saijo, Sj¨ostr¨om, and Yamato, 2006; Saijo, Sj¨ostr¨om, and Yamato, 2007) to the problem of allocating indivisible objects with monetary transfers. We propose a new domain-richness condition, termed as minimal...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003556299

An exact non-cooperative support for the sequential Raiffa solution

Trockel, Walter - 2009

This article provides an exact non-cooperative foundation of the sequential Raiffa solution for two person bargaining … games. Based on an approximate foundation due to Myerson (1997) for any two-person bargaining game (S,d) an extensive form …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003944582

Does Strengthening Collective Action Clauses (CACs) Help?

Ghosal, Sayantan; Kannika Thampanishvong - 2007

We study the effect of strengthening CACs in a debt rollover model of a sovereign debt crisis. Conditional on default, there are multiple equilibria: the impact of strengthening CACs depends critically on the prevailing equilibrium. For a subset of equilibria, (i) given a fixed number of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014049846

The choice of the agenda in labor negotiations : efficiency and behavioral considerations

Königstein, Manfred (contributor); … - 2005

participants show a preference for decision authority and choose single-issue bargaining in most cases even though efficiency is …The labor economics literature has shown that the "efficient bargaining" model, in which wage and employment are … wage is determined via bargaining and employment determined subsequently and unilaterally by the firm. This paper reports …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003115148

Trade, insecurity, and the costs of conflict

Garfinkel, Michelle Robin; Skaperdas, Stergios; … - 2022

Typically, economics assumes that property rights over productive resources or goods are perfectly defined and costlessly enforced. The costs of insecurity and the resultant conflict are, however, real and often economically significant. In this paper, we examine how international trade regimes...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013419262

The New Keynesian Phillips Curve and staggered price and wage determination in a model with firm-specific labor

Carlsson, Mikael; Westermark, Andreas - 2009 - rev.

We develop a DSGE model with firm-specific labor where firm-level wage bargaining and price setting are subject to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010127998

Strategic effects of incomplete and renegotiation-proof contracts

Koçkesen, Levent; Gerratana, Emanuele - 2009

interaction and thus serve as a commitment device. We address this issue when contracts are renegotiable. More precisely, we …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008670145

Harmful signaling in matching markets

Kushnir, Alexey - 2010

Some labor markets have recently developed formal signalling mechanisms, e.g. the signalling for interviews in the job market for new Ph.D. economists. We evaluate the effect of such mechanisms on two-sided matching markets by considering a game of incomplete information between firms and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008737789

Secure implementation in Shapley-Scarf housing markets

Fujinaka, Yuji; Wakayama, Takuma - 2009 - Rev.

This paper considers the object allocation problem introduced by Shapley and Scarf (1974). We study secure implementation (Saijo, Sjöström, and Yamato, 2007), that is, double implementation in dominant strategy and Nash equilibria. We prove that (i) an individually rational solution is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003819988

Strategic Effects of Incomplete and Renegotiation-Proof Contracts

Gerratana, Emanuele; Koçkesen, Levent - 2015

interaction and thus serve as a commitment device. We address this issue when contracts are renegotiable. More precisely, we …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012707308