Due to incomplete contracts, efficiency of an organization depends on willingness of individuals to take non-selfish actions, such as cooperating when there is no incentive to do so or punishing inefficient actions by others. Organizations also constitute a social boundary, or group. We...

Due to incomplete contracts, efficiency of an organization depends on willingness of individuals to take non-selfish actions, e.g., cooperate when there is no incentive to do so, or punish inefficient actions by others. Organizations also constitute a social boundary, or group. We investigate...

We use natural experiments plausibly exogenous, anticipated increases in the piece rate to study how effort responds to incentives. Our first finding, like some previous studies, lends little support to the view that incentives increase effort: raising the piece rate has zero effect on total...

Economists are increasingly interested in how group membership affects individual behavior. The standard method assigns individuals to “minimal” groups, i.e. arbitrary labels, in a lab. But real groups often involve social interactions leading to social ties between group members. Our...

We use natural experiments - plausibly exogenous, anticipated increases in the piece rate - to study how effort responds to incentives. Our first finding, like some previous studies, lends little support to the view that incentives increase effort: raising the piece rate has zero effect on total...