to adverse selection in insurance markets. However, some consumers value their privacy and dislike sharing private … risk type for an individual subjective cost and show analytically how this affects insurance market equilibria as well as … digitalization. It shows that new technologies bring new ways to challenge crosssubsidization in insurance markets and stresses the …

beginning of modern economic analysis of insurance activity. This chapter reviews the main theoretical and empirical … contributions in insurance economics since that time. The review begins with the role of utility, risk, and risk aversion in the … insurance literature and summarizes work on the demand for insurance, insurance and resource allocation, moral hazard, and …

We consider a competitive insurance market with adverse selection. Unlike the standard models, we assume that … limited liability afforded via bankruptcy laws. Government assistance is calculated ex post of any insurance benefits. This … alters the individuals' demand for insurance coverage. In turn, this affects equilibria in various insurance models of …

to mitigate adverse selection and improve insurance market efficiency, but it may have undesirable equity or efficiency … consequences. We employ a canonical screening model of insurance contracting to study these trade-offs in a range of informational …

." Using the insurance market example of Rothschild-Stiglitz (1976) I show that biases of high-risk individuals have … is possible, that a breakdown of the insurance market occurs. This extreme result is more likely in insurance markets …

to a catastrophe. Distinct from the existing literature on insurance cycles, we model optimal contracting by competitive … insurance cycle …

We study a competitive insurance market in which insurers have an imperfect informative advantage over policyholders … levels, the persistent profitability and the pooling of risk observed in some insurance markets. Furthermore, we find that a … lower market concentration may entail an increase in insurance premia. …

We consider a model of competitive insurance markets under asymmetric information with ambiguity-averse agents who … insurees buy full insurance. Second, in separating equilibria where the low risks are underinsured their equilibrium contract …

We consider a model of competitive insurance markets under asymmetric information with ambiguity-averse agents who … insurees buy full insurance. Second, in separating equilibria where the low risks are underinsured their equilibrium contract …