We build a model in which financial intermediaries provide insurance to households against a liquidity shock. Households can also invest directly on a financial market if they pay a cost. In equilibrium, the ability of intermediaries to share risk is constrained by the market. This can be...

In this paper, we address the question whether increasing households' financial market access improves welfare in a financial system in which there is intense competition among banks for private households' funds. Following earlier work by Diamond and by Fecht, we use a model in which the degree...

In many models of financial intermediation, markets reduce welfare because they limit the amount of risk-sharing intermediaries can offer. In this paper we study a model in which markets also promote investment in a productive technology. A trade-off between risk sharing and growth arises...

An economy in which deposit-taking banks of a Diamond/ Dybvig style and an asset market coexist is modelled. Firstly, within this framework we characterize distinct financial systems depending on the fraction of households with direct investment opportunities that are less efficient than those...

An economy in which deposit-taking banks of a Diamond/Dybvig style and an asset market coexist is modelled. Firstly, within this framework we characterize distinct financial systems depending on the fraction of households with direct investment opportunities that are less efficient than those...