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employee's performance was poor. The justification assures the employee that the manager has not distorted the evaluation …? Suppose a manager's evaluation is private information. Justifying her evaluation is costly but limits the principal's scope … for distorting her evaluation of the employee. I show that the manager justifies her evaluation if and only if the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011930440
evaluation to the agent if the evaluation turns out to be bad. The justification assures the agent that the principal has not … her evaluation. For good performance, however, the principal pays a constant high wage without justification. Furthermore …Should principals explain and justify their evaluations? In this paper the principal's evaluation is private …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009569527
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012131478
We analyze a multitasking model with a verifiable routine task and a skill-dependent activity characterized by moral hazard. Contracts negotiated by firm/employee pairs follow from Nash bargaining. High- and low-skilled employees specialize, intermediate productivity employees perform both...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013201713
Adverse selection harms workers, but benefits firms able to identify talent. An informed intermediary expropriates its agents' ability by threatening to fire and expose them to undervaluation of their skill. Agents' track record gradually reduces the intermediary's information advantage. We show...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012842301
We analyze a multitasking model with a verifiable routine task and a skill-dependent activity characterized by moral hazard. Contracts negotiated by firm/employee pairs follow from Nash bargaining. High- and low-skilled employees specialize, intermediate productivity employees perform both...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014083473
possesses no capital and enjoys limited liability, so cannot be sold the project. The optimal long-term contract involves … impact of hiring an expert, and show how the optimal contract changes when the expert has initial capital, can be replaced …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012922810
optimal contract with a strikingly simple closed form — that efficiently motivate the same productive action. Because … incentives can be embedded in the measure or the contract, any distortions in one are offset by adjusting the other, which can …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012823241
This paper models two key roles of subjective performance evaluations: their incentive role and their feedback role. The paper shows that the feedback role makes subjective pay feasible even without repeated interaction, as long as there exists some verifiable measure of performance. It also...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009388480
choice is more accurate than a noisy public performance measure. For some contingencies the optimal contract has to specify … the loss from termination is small. Under an optimal contract the agent's wage may depend only on the principal's report … and not on the public signal. Nonetheless, public information is valuable as it facilitates truthful subjective evaluation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009752336