Information sharing and collateral reduce adverse selection costs, but are costly for lenders. When a bank learns more about the types of its rival's borrowers through information sharing (e.g., credit bureaus), it might seem that this information should substitute the role of collateral in...

We examine banks' choice between two costly instruments used to identify good loan applicants: direct screening by acquiring borrower-specific information and collateral requirements. We show that with longer relationships the preference for screening increases both in initial and in later...

Since information asymmetries have been identified as an important source of bank profits, it may seem that the establishment of information sharing (e.g., introducing credit bureaus or public registers) will lead to lower investment in acquiring information. However, banks base their decisions...

We find that the controlling family holds both the chief executive officer and chair positions in 79% of Norwegian family firms. The family holds more governance positions when it owns large stakes in small, profitable, low-risk firms. This result suggests that the family trades off expected...

We study the impact of loan-to-value regulation on supply and demand for unregulated debt that is used for home acquisition. In our setting, part of the dwelling price is in the form of pre-existing debt exempt from the regulation. Variations in the latter prior to the LTV regulation generated...

We study the impact of higher capital requirements on banks' decisions to grant collateralized rather than uncollateralized loans. We exploit the 2011 EBA capital exercise, a quasi-natural experiment that required a number of banks to increase their regulatory capital but not others. This...