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The risk-based core for cooperative games with uncertainty

Kóczy, László Á. - 2019

In coalitional games with uncertain payoffs, a deviating coalition can only form expectations regarding its post-deviation payoff. Classical approaches address the problem from the side of conservatism, expecting the worst, or by explicit assumptions of the emerging state of the world. We borrow...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012016409

Cartel formation in Cournot competition with asymmetric costs : a partition function approach

Abe, Takaaki - In: Games 12 (2021) 1/14, pp. 1-16

In this paper, we use a partition function form game to analyze cartel formation among firms in Cournot competition. We assume that a firm obtains a certain cost advantage that allows it to produce goods at a lower unit cost. We show that if the level of the cost advantage is "moderate", then...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012432603

A property rights based consolidation approach

Casajus, André; Labrenz, Helfried - 2014

We suggest a full consolidation approach that takes into account the property rights structure whithin the subsidiaries, in particular, the majority requirements on restructurings. Our approach employs a property rights index based on cooperative game theory.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010239888

Axiomatizations of permission values for games with a hierarchical permission structure using split neutrality

Brink, René van den - 2003

Recently, cooperative game theory has been applied to various economic allocation problems in which players are not fully anonymous but belong to some relational structure. One of the most developed models in this respect are communications situations or (symmetric) network situations in which...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011334335

Marginality, dividends, and the value in games with externalities

Hüttner, Frank; Casajus, André - 2019

In the absence of externalities, marginality is equivalent to an independence property that rests on Harsanyi … and independence for games with externalities. We measure a player‘s contribution in an embedded coalition by the change …. The introduced method also allows us to investigate egalitarian solutions and to reveal how accounting for externalities …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012010357

Graphs Inducing Totally Balanced and Submodular Chinese Postman Games

Albizuri, M. Josune - 2013

A Chinese postman (CP) game is induced by a a weighted undirected, connected graph in which the edges are identified as players and a vertex is chosen as post-office location. Granot and Granot (2012) characterized graphs that give rise to CP games that are balanced. This note completes this...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013088117

Incomplete Stable Structures in Symmetric Convex Games

Slikker, Marco; Norde, Henk - 2000

We study the model of link formation that was introduced by Aumann and Myerson (1988) and focus on symmetric convex games with transferable utilities. We show that with at most five players the full cooperation structure results according to a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Moreover, if the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014142629

On Maskin monotonicity of solution based social choice rules

Haake, Claus-Jochen (contributor); … - 2007

Howard (1992) argues that the Nash bargaining solution is not Nash implementable, as it does not satisfy Maskin monotonicity. His arguments can be extended to other bargaining solutions as well. However, by defining a social choice correspondence that is based on the solution rather than on its...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003731672

Cooperative strategic games

Kohlberg, Elon; Neyman, Abraham - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 16 (2021) 3, pp. 825-851

The value is a solution concept for n-person strategic games, developed by Nash, Shapley, and Harsanyi. The value of a game is an a priori evaluation of the economic worth of the position of each player, reflecting the players' strategic possibilities, including their ability to make threats...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012806287

An axiomatic characterization of a value for games in partition function form

Hu, Cheng-Cheng; Yang, Yi-You - In: SERIEs : Journal of the Spanish Economic Association 1 (2010) 4, pp. 475-487

of the marginal contributions for environments with externalities. The dummy property related to it is defined. We adapt … average approach provided by Macho-Stadler et al. (J Econ Theory 135:339-356, 2007). -- externalities ; marginal contributions …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009355896