We extend the analysis of optimal self-reporting schemes to situations like corruption where two individuals are required for a criminal act. This leads to strategic interactions in the self-reporting stage, because the fine can be made dependent on whether the accomplice self-reports or not....

In this paper I examine a number of economic arguments for the legal regulation of morality. Firstly, I present the harm principle as it was famously defined by John Stuart Mill, not only as a principle for a liberal objective criminal law but as a guiding principle for political liberalism. I...

Regulatory agencies frequently present violators with warnings, not pursuing prosecution if the violation ceases upon receipt of the warning. We show how such warnings may help regulators to keep control: Prosecution is costly for the regulator, and insufficient prosecution efforts yield low...

This articles explores the history of federal SSI/SSDI benefits for those disabled by addictions, the competing definitions of addiction itself, and the policy rationales for repeated changes in the rules. I argue, as a policy matter, that addicts should be allowed to receive SSI/SSDI disability...

This chapter surveys the theory of the public enforcement of law—the use of governmental agents (regulators, inspectors, tax auditors, police, prosecutors) to detect and to sanction violators of legal rules. The theoretical core of the analysis addresses the following basic questions: Should...

This paper analyzes a contest in which defenders move first, have private information about the value of the objects they are trying to protect, and determine the observability of their defense efforts. The equilibrium consistent with the intuitive criterion depends on the distribution of...

This paper analyzes private precautions against crime when the value of the property to be protected is private information. Within a framework in which potential criminals can choose between various crime opportunities, we establish that decentralized decision-making by potential victims may...

In a bribery experiment, we test the hypothesis that distributive fairness considerations make relatively well-paid public officials less corruptible. Corrupt decisions impose damages to workers whose wage is varied in two treatments. However, there is no apparent difference in behaviour.