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Which budgetary institutions result in efficient provision of public goods? We analyze a model with two parties bargaining over the allocation to a public good each period. Parties place different values on the public good, and these values may change over time. We focus on budgetary...
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In this paper we present a structural approach to the study of government formation in multi-party parliamentary democracies. The approach is based on the estimation of a stochastic bargaining model which we use to investigate the effects of specific institutional features of parliamentary...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012730929
In this paper we present a structural approach to the study of government formation in multi party parliamentary democracies. The approach is based on the estimation of a stochastic bargaining model which we use to investigate the effects of specific institutional features of parliamentary...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014123040
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When do voters win? In this paper we derive conditions under which a democracy will produce policies that favor the voter over special interests. We show that increasing political competition, increasing office holding benefits, decreasing potential rents to firms and increasing the salience of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014040229
Two heterogeneous agents contribute over time to a joint project, and collectively decide its scope. A larger scope requires greater cumulative effort and delivers higher benefits upon completion. We show that the efficient agent prefers a smaller scope, and preferences are time-inconsistent: as...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012980151
Tariff bindings and administered protection are two characteristics of the WTO that are little understood. Tariff bindings place a ceiling on tariffs that is not always reached, while administered protection ensures that all sectors have access to some minimum import protection, effectively...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013090383
This paper presents a theory of optimal multilateral trade agreements with public political shocks. Optimal multilateral agreements exhibit "forbearance'' – where one country withholds retaliation when its trading partner receives a shock. This provides a rationale for countries not acting on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013092167