Incentivizing unobservable effort in risky environments, such as in insurance, credit, and labor markets, is vital as moral hazard may otherwise cause significant welfare losses including the outright failure of markets. Ensuring incentive-compatibility through state-contingent contracts between...

The United States' aging population puts pressure on the pension system. Pension reforms consider putting more weight on individually managed retirement savings. Public policy and financial planners, being concerned with households making wise asset allocation decisions, need measures to...

Reputational risk has become a critical concern for most organizations. Insurers, who rely on trust to generate business, are particularly vulnerable. Maintaining a positive reputation, however, is costly, leading to the potential for moral hazard in the form of choosing a lowercost strategy...

We explore whether life insurers use a unique reinsurance arrangement to manage their regulatory capital. Typical reinsurance arrangements allow insurers to reduce their regulatory capital by transferring liabilities, and the associated assets, to reinsurers. With modified coinsurance, insurers...

In this article, we establish a model of competitive insurance markets based on Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) where insurers can perform risk classification tests either before insurance contracts are issued (underwriting) or when coverage claims are filed (post-loss test). However, insurers...

We advance the literature starting from the work by Dixit (2000), who considers the effect of the principle of good faith on adverse selection. Introducing a post-loss risk misrepresentation testing in a competitive insurance market model, we identify a sufficient condition to guarantee that a...