Individuals often repeatedly face a choice of whether to obey a particular legal rule. Conventional legal scholarship assumes that whether such a choice is made repeatedly or is a one-time event has no effect on individuals' decisions. In either case, individuals are expected to maximize their...

Under the formal procedural rules, fact-finders are required to apply a uniform standard of proof in all criminal cases. Experimental studies as well as real world examples indicate, however, that fact-finders often adjust the evidentiary threshold for conviction in accordance with the severity...

Under the conventional tort law paradigm, a tortfeasor behaves unreasonably where two conditions are met: The tortfeasor could have averted the harm by investing in cost-effective precautions and failed to do so, and other, more cost-effective precautions were not available to the victim. Torts...

The chapter, in the Oxford Handbook of Behavioral Economics and the Law, discusses the contributions of cognitive psychology and behavioral studies to the research of tort law. These contributions, we show, relate to a wide range of issues in torts: from the basic decision to impose tort...

An injurer's activity often exposes multiple victims to the risk of harm. We show that under negligence, the tort system's dominant regime, such victims face a collective-action problem in choosing their activity levels. An increase in one victim's activity level confers a positive externality...

Tort law consists of multiple doctrines governing the assignment of liability and the calculation of damages. But in what sequence should courts apply these doctrines? Does it matter, for example, whether a court applies comparative fault before or after mitigation of damages? The answer, rather...

Conventional wisdom in law and economics has long been that negligence-based regimes induce optimal care but encourage excessive activity. This paper demonstrates that when behavior involves multiple victims or injurers, negligence-based regimes can create a collective action problem which...

When harm is caused by multiple injurers, damages are allocated among the responsible injurers in proportion to their relative responsibility for harm. This Article shows that a proportional allocation of liability between strictly-liable injurers distorts incentives to take precautions. The...