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Ambiguous implementation : the partition model

Castro, Luciano I. de; Liu, Zhiwei; Yannelis, Nicholas C. - In: Economic theory : official journal of the Society for … 63 (2017) 1, pp. 233-261

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011723503

Randomization under ambiguity : efficiency and incentive compatibility

Liu, Zhiwei; Song, Xinxi; Yannelis, Nicholas C. - In: Journal of mathematical economics 90 (2020), pp. 1-11

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012800689

Implementation under ambiguity : the maximin core

Liu, Zhiwei; Yannelis, Nicholas C. - 2013

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010239145

A note on the welfare of the maximin rational expectations

Liu, Zhiwei - In: Economic theory bulletin 2 (2014) 2, pp. 213-218

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010428150

Negative network effects and public policy in vaccine markets

Amir, Rabah; Liu, Zhiwei; Tian, Jingwen - In: Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO 216 (2023), pp. 136-149

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014478564

On the existence of a Bayesian nash equilibrium

Yannelis, Nicholas C. - In: Functional analysis and economic theory : with 6 tables, (pp. 291-296). 1998

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001302068

The core of an economy with differential information

Yannelis, Nicholas C. - In: Economic theory : official journal of the Society for … 1 (1991) 2, pp. 183-198

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001104572

The core of an economy with differential information

Yannelis, Nicholas C. - In: Differential information economies, (pp. 73-86). 2005

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003048439

Debreu's social equilibrium theorem with asymmetric information and a continuum of agents

Yannelis, Nicholas C. - In: Economic theory : official journal of the Society for … 38 (2009) 2, pp. 419-432

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003783174

Essays on differential information economies

Hahn, Guangsug - 1996

In the first essay, we analyze the necessary and sufficient conditions for coalitional Bayesian Nash implementation. A mechanism coalitionally implements a social choice set if any outcome of the social choice set can be achieved as a coalitional Bayesian Nash equilibrium of a mechanism and vice...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009477616