When bad economics is good politics / Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Hilton L. Root -- Order, disorder, and economic change: Latin America versus North America / Douglass C. North, William Summerhill, and Barry R. Weingast -- Political institutions, political survival, and policy success / Bruce...

"The authors construct a provocative theory on the selection of leaders and present specific formal models from which their central claims can be deduced. They show how political leaders allocate resources and how institutions for selecting leaders create incentives for leaders to pursue good...

A new measure for selectorate’s theory central concept, winning coalition size, isdeveloped using indicators developed by the V-Dem project (Coppedge et al., 2021). Todemonstrate the measure’s efficacy, we examine its ability to account for governmentprovision of public and private goods, a...

Theories that link domestic politics, domestic institutional structures, and leader incentives to foreign affairs have flowered in the past 25 years or so. By unpacking institutional variation across states and by drawing attention to agency issues between leaders, key backers, and citizens,...