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Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010389704
In tort litigation, delayed settlement or impasse imposes high costs on the parties and society. Litigation institutions might influence social welfare by affecting the likelihood of out-of-court settlement and the potential injurers' investment in product safety. An appropriate design of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014139770
This paper reports the results of an experiment designed to assess the ability of an enforcement agency to detect and deter harmful short-term activities committed by groups of injurers. With ordered-leniency policies, early cooperators receive reduced sanctions. We replicate the strategic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011927250
Vertical restraints, such as vertical integration, exclusive dealing contracts, and tying and bundling practices, have been subject of lively policy and academic discussions. Scholars associated with the Chicago School challenged early foreclosure doctrines by arguing that vertical restraints...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013036361
We study a multi-task principal-agent problem in which tasks can be in direct conflict with each other. In theory, it is difficult to induce a single agent to exert efforts in two conflicting tasks, because effort in one task decreases the success probability of the other task. We have conducted...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014202367
African populations need better support through social protection mechanisms. Among those who need social security are millions of older people who, having worked all their lives in the formal sector, are in precarious situations with lower benefits. This study aims to appreciate theoretically,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011581094
This paper studies an infinite horizon repeated moral hazard problem where a single principal employs several agents. We assume that the principal cannot observe the agents' effort choices; however, agents can observe each other and can be contractually required to make observation reports to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011674064
We study optimal incentive contracts for workers who are reciprocal to management attention. When neither worker's effort nor manager's attention can be contracted, a double moral-hazard problem arises, implying that reciprocal workers should be given weak financial incentives. In a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011377049
Social interaction with colleagues is an important job attribute for many workers. To attract and retain workers, managers therefore need to think about how to create and preserve high-quality co-worker relationships. This paper develops a principal-multi-agent model where agents do not only...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011377106
We conduct experimental games with police applicants in Germany to investigate whether intrinsically motivated agents self-select into public service. Our focus is on trustworthiness and the willingness to enforce norms as key dimensions of intrinsic motivation in the police context. We find...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011573312