The paper reports laboratory experiments on a day-to-day route choice game with two routes. Subjects had to choose between a main road M and a side road S. The capacity was greater for the main road. 18 subjects participated in each session. In equilibrium the number of subjects is 12 on M and 6...

This research presents an application of the Hogan, Rosellón and Vogelsang (2010) (HRV) mechanism to promote electricity transmission network expansion in the Peruvian electricity transmission system known as SEIN (Sistema Eléctrico Interconectado Nacional). The HRV mechanism combines the...

We present in this paper the application of a cross entropy method (CEM) to the vehicle routing problem (VRP). The CEM is a heuristic based on the statistical method of importance sampling for rare event simulation. We found that the CEM can be easily adapted to different versions of the VRP,...

We propose a price-cap mechanism for electricity-transmission expansion based on redefining transmission output in terms of financial transmission rights. Our mechanism applies the incentive-regulation logic of rebalancing a two-part tariff. First, we test this mechanism in a three-node network....

We investigate the strategic impact of flexible delivery frequencies on the competition of logistics service providers (LSPs) in a supply chain. LSPs compete for customers who choose an exclusive service provider based on their individual preference, prices and inventory costs. The service...

Express service carriers provide time-guaranteed deliveries of parcels via a network consisting of nodes and hubs. In this, nodes take care of the collection and delivery of parcels, and hubs have the function to consolidate parcels in between the nodes. The tactical network design problem...

A monopolist in public transport may oversupply frequency relative to the social optimum, as Van Reeven (2008) demonstrates with homogeneous consumers. This result generalizes for heterogeneous consumers who know the timetable. Whether a monopolist oversupplies or undersupplies frequency depends...

Transportation, the second largest contributor of CO2 emissions, is not part of the European Emission Trading System. Since transportation is subject to national environmental instruments, this causes differences in marginal abatement costs, and hence, results in economic inefficiencies. We...

This paper analyzes the effects of price differentiation and discrimination by a monopolistic transport operator, which sets fares in a congestible network. Using three models, with different spatial structures, we describe the operator’s optimal strategies in an unregulated market, a market...

Transport constraints limit competition and arbitrageurs' possibilities of exploiting price differences between goods in neighbouring markets, especially when storage capacity is negligible. We analyse this in markets where strategic producers compete with supply functions, as in wholesale...