We study strategic interactions between firms with heterogeneous beliefs about future climate impacts. To that end, we propose a Cournot-type equilibrium model where firms choose mitigation efforts and production quantities such as to maximize the expected profits under their subjective beliefs....

Following the risk-taking model of Seel and Strack, n players decide when to stop privately observed Brownian motions with drift and absorption at zero. They are then ranked according to their level of stopping and paid a rank-dependent reward. We study the problem of a principal who aims to...

We introduce a notion of volatility uncertainty in discrete time and define the corresponding analogue of Pengs G-expectation. In the continuous-time limit, the resulting sublinear expectation converges weakly to the G-expectation. This can be seen as a Donsker-type result for the G-Brownian...

We consider dynamic sublinear expectations (i.e., time-consistent coherent risk measures) whose scenario sets consist of singular measures corresponding to a general form of volatility uncertainty. We derive a càdlàg nonlinear martingale which is also the value process of a superhedging...

We introduce a mean field game with rank-based reward: competing agents optimize their effort to achieve a goal, are ranked according to their completion time, and paid a reward based on their relative rank. First, we propose a tractable Poissonian model in which we can describe the optimal...