This paper evaluates the consequences of renewable energy policies on welfare, resource rents and energy costs in a world where carbon pricing is imperfect and the regulator seeks to limit emissions to a (cumulative) target. We use a global general equilibrium model with an intertemporal fossil...

Using Putnam’s two‐level game approach, we discuss the influence of domestic players that can veto the ratification of international environmental agreements on the breadth and depth of such treaties. We first show that in a symmetric Barrett‐type payoff model, veto-players can restrict...

Lemoine and Rudik (2017) argue that it is efficient to delay reducing carbon emissions, because there is substantial inertia in the climate system. However, this conclusion rests upon misunderstanding the relevant climate physics: there is no substantial lag between CO2 emissions and warming,...

We develop a model of optimal carbon taxation and redistribution taking into account horizontal equity concerns by considering heterogeneous energy efficiencies. By deriving first- and secondbest rules for policy instruments including carbon taxes, transfers and energy subsidies, we then...

We introduce endogenous directed technical change into numerical integrated climate and development policy assessment. We distinguish expenditures on innovation (R&D) and imitation (international technology spillovers) and consider the role of capital investment in creating and implementing new...