Constitutive rules, as prominently theorized by John Searle, create the very possibility of engaging in some form of behavior. This distinguishes constitutive rules from regulative rules, which seek to regulate antecedently extant and defined behavior. So although it is conceptually possible to...

Both criminal and regulatory law have traditionally been skeptical of what Jeremy Bentham referred to as evidentiary offenses - the prohibition (or regulation) of some activity not because it is wrong, but because it probabilistically (but not universally) indicates that a real wrong has...

A lie involves three elements: deceptive intent, an inaccurate message, and a harmful effect. When only one or two of these elements is present we do not call the activity lying, even when the practice is no less morally questionable or socially detrimental. This essay explores this area of...

This paper challenges the widespread view that the legal system's conception of causation is largely deterministic and token-level, that view stemming from the law's principal focus on assigning ex post responsibility for past acts. We argue, in opposition to this view, that the probabilistic,...