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This paper studies information transmission in a two-sender, multidimensional cheap talk setting where there are exogenous constraints on the (convex) feasible set of policies for the receiver and where the receiver is uncertain about both the directions and the magnitudes of the senders' bias...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012158784
It is often argued that certifiers have an incentive to offer inflated certificates, although they deny it. In this paper, we study a model in which a certifier is paid by sellers, and may offer them inflated certificates, but incurs costs if doing so. We find that the certifier may face a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009411261
(individual rating), the credibility of a good rating in an inflationary equilibrium of the signaling game is limited by the … average level of credibility for its good ratings than in individual rating. In decentralized rating, the ratings are again … degree of rating inflation and hence a greater level of credibility than in individual rating. Comparing centralized rating …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011700252
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A strong correlated equilibrium is a correlated strategy profile that is immune to joint deviations. Different notions of strong correlated equilibria have been defined in the literature. One major difference among those definitions is the stage in which coalitions can plan a joint deviation:...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014205603
A key to the Coase conjecture is the monopolist’s inability to commit to a price, which leads consumers to believe that a high current price will be followed by low future prices. This paper studies the robustness of the Coase conjecture with respect to these beliefs of consumers. In...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014212783
This paper investigates robust information transmission between a sender and a receiver in the Crawford and Sobel (1982) model. We characterize behavior that remains equilibrium behavior independently of the form of a small communication cost. Under standard conditions, we find that an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014076683
We describe a methodology for making counterfactual predictions when the information held by strategic agents is a latent parameter. The analyst observes behavior which is rationalized by a Bayesian model in which agents maximize expected utility, given partial and differential information...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012892592
Using sector-level survey data for the universe of Japanese firms, we establish the positive co-movement in the firm’s expectations about aggregate and sector-specific demand shocks. We show that a simple model with imperfect information on the current aggregate and sector-specific components...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013241100