This paper investigates the effects of changes in retail market concentration when input prices are negotiated. Results are derived from a model of bilateral Nash-bargaining between upstream and downstream firms which allows for general forms of demand and retail competition. Whether...

We consider a streaming platform which carries content from various upstream content providers. Participating customers face personalized recommendations from the platform and consume a mix of content originating from each provider. We analyze when the platform uses its personalized...

We consider a platform that carries content from two upstream content providers and presents personalized recommendations to participating customers. We focus on streaming platforms in media markets, where users pay a subscription fee to join the platform but no usage fee, and consume a mix of...

Platforms acting as sales channels for producers often charge users for access, via a subscription fee or a markup on hardware. We compare two common forms of vertical pricing agreement that platforms use with sellers: per-­unit and proportional fees. In particular, we analyze the critical role...

We analyse the effects of input price discrimination in the canonical model where an upstream monopolist sells to downstream firms with various degrees of efficiency. We first recast a series of existing results within our setting, extending previous findings related to discrimination in...

We consider a streaming platform which carries content from various upstream content providers. Participating customers face personalized recommendations from the platform and consume a mix of content originating from each provider. We analyze when the platform uses its personalized...

This article revisits the opportunism problem faced by an upstream monopolist contracting with several retailers over secret agreements, when contracts are linear. We characterize the equilibrium under secret contracts and compare it to that under public contracts in a setting allowing for...

We provide a framework of analysis for models of imperfect competition when firms compete in quality as well as in another instrument (either price or quantity). The equilibrium can notably be characterized through a quality parameter, which depends on firms' diversion ratios. Extending the...