We use agency theory to investigate the influence of CEO dominance on variation in capital structure. Due to agency conflicts, managers may not always adopt leverage choices that maximize shareholders' value. Consistent with the prediction of agency theory, the evidence reveals that, when the...

We examine the impact of Level 3 assets held by non-financial companies on credit risk. Specifically, we investigate how the pricing uncertainty of Level 3 assets is reflected in credit ratings, corporate bond yield spreads, and incidences of bond covenants. We find that higher holdings of Level...

The existing research of inter-jurisdictional policy implementation relies on aggregated data from established or completed networks, which cannot discern individual level heterogeneity among policymakers in earlier stages of interlocal collaboration. Further, scholars have difficulties to...

Executive pensions and deferred compensation, collectively referred to as inside debt, tend to align CEO incentives with those of debt holders. Although CEO equity compensation is well known to induce risk-shifting incentives and thereby add to the agency cost of debt, too much inside debt may...