We study the impact of health insurance expansion in the US on health expenditure, longevity growth and welfare in an overlapping generations economy in which individuals purchase health care to lower mortality. We consider three sectors: final goods production; a health care sector, selling...

We analyze individuals with heterogeneous time-inconsistent preferences that consume sin goods and make a savings decision. A government may tax the sin good and provide mandatory health insurance. Due to time-inconsistency, the individual sin good and savings choices in ict internalities. Due...

The theory of the optimal-consumption leisure choice under price dispersion describes the phenomenon of moral hazard as the customer's reaction on unfair insurance policy. The unfair insurance offer does not equalize marginal costs of propensity to seek healthcare with marginal benefits on...

Health insurance premiums often do not reflect individual health risks, implying redistribution from individuals with low health risks to individuals with high health risks. This paper studies whether more cost-sharing leads to less redistribution and to lower welfare of high-risk individuals....

Moral hazard in health insurance arises when insured individuals are incentivized to over-utilize healthcare services, especially when they face low out-of-pocket costs. While existing literature primarily addresses moral hazard through qualitative studies, this paper introduces a quantitative...