We analyze cheap talk warnings about a strategic adversary, with applications to cybersecurity and national security. Each period an expert receives a noisy private signal about whether an attack by the adversary is feasible. The expert wants to warn a decision maker while also maintaining...

We study compliance dynamics generated by a large set of behavioral rules describing social interaction in a population of agents facing an enforcement authority. When the authority adjusts the auditing probability every period, cycling in cheating-auditing occurs: Intensive monitoring induces...

The best-performing and most popular algorithms are often the least explainable. In parallel, there is growing concern and evidence that sophisticated algorithms may engage, autonomously, in profit-maximizing but welfare-damaging strategies. Drawing on the literature on self-regulation and...

This article develops a behavioral theory of inchoate offenses - criminal attempt, conspiracy, and solicitation. The theory helps explain why inchoate crimes exist and why they are punished less severely than the underlying offense. The article identifies an important aspect of criminal...

We run an experiment in which two subjects play a two-round minimum effort game in the presence of a third player (principal) who is the only one informed about past effort choices and benefits from a higher minimum effort of the others. Sanctions introduced in the second round by the...

We develop a theoretical framework for studying the effects of interaction on the quaJity of decision-making by monetary policy committees. We show that interaction, i.e. increasing one's expertise through an exchange of views, is most likely not to result in interdependent voting...