In this paper we consider a model where boundedly rational agents choose both which coordination game to play and what action to take in that game, when their information and mobility is limited and change over time. We completely characterize both short-run and long-run outcomes. There are...

This paper examines the consequences and limitations of the contestation relation [Schwartz, 1990]. In doing so, a new family of tournament solutions are introduced and related to existing refinements of the Banks set [Banks, 1985]. Additionally, the connection between the contestation relation...

We extend classical ideal point estimation to allow voters to have different preferences when voting in different domains – for example when voting on agricultural policy than when voting on defense policy. Our scaling procedure results in estimated ideal points on a common scale. As a result,...

In 1995 the U.S. House of Representatives instituted a new rule that required the Speaker of the House to designate a primary committee on legislation referred to multiple committees, and in this paper we model the effect of instituting a “primary referral” rule on committee legislative...