Many cartels are formed by individual managers of different firms, but not by firms as collectives. However, most of the literature in industrial economics neglects individuals' incentives to form cartels. Although oligopoly experiments reveal important insights on individuals acting as firms,...

This is a survey of the economic principles that underlie antitrust law and how those principles relate to competition policy. We address four core subject areas: market power, collusion, mergers between competitors, and monopolization. In each area, we select the most relevant portions of...

Prices may differ between regional markets if transport capacities are limited. We develop a new approach to determine to which extent such differences stem from limited participation in cross-border trader rather than from bottlenecks. We derive a theoretical integration benchmark for the...

We model merger control procedures as a process of sequential acquisition of information and compare US and EU procedures. In the US, the authorities do not have to justify their decision to require further information (issue a second request), whereas in the EU, the authorities face a different...

This paper develops a three-stage model of innovation, fixed-fee licensing and production to evaluate the welfare effects of compulsory licensing, taking into account both static (information sharing) and dynamic (innovation incentive) effects. Compulsory licensing is shown to have an...